

A Secure Network Stack for the Untrusted Cloud



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


Context

- **Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)** provides **integrity** and **confidentiality** in **untrusted** environments
- **Cloud** not inherently malicious but **subject to bugs** or **data leakage**
- **Cloud** is a prime **target of attacks**
- Example of TEE: Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, etc.


Problem

- Existing TEE-based **applications rely on untrusted network stack**
- **No isolation** from other components
- **No metadata protection**



Proposal: Shinkansen

- 1) Network card with encryption
- 2) User-space packet I/O library
- 3) User-space secure TCP stack
- 4) Stream/packet processing API for debugging, logging, etc.





Implementation

- Network card: Mellanox **SmartNIC**
- Packet I/O library: **DPDK**
- Secure TCP stack: **mTCP**
- TEE: Intel **SGX** enclave



Performance optimisations:

- Batching of network operations
- Delegation mechanism avoids transitions




Microbenchmark performance

- Intel SGX capable processor
- 10Gbps standard NIC



- 15% overhead due to enclave transitions w/ DPDK
- SmartNIC AES-GCM encryption: 477Mbps / core

Applications performance



- **9% performance overhead**

